Joël Soudron (born 27 April 1979)[1] is a French convicted drug trafficker from Guadeloupe. In 2018, while serving a six-year prison sentence for drug trafficking at Réau prison, he escaped while on temporary prison leave. He subsequently became an international fugitive and was included on Europol's list of Europe's most wanted fugitives. Soudron was arrested in Panama on 30 March 2026 after more than seven years on the run.[2]
Soudron was suspected by French investigators of leading a network that transported cocaine to metropolitan France. According to RTL, an investigation by the French Anti-Narcotics Office (OFAST) found that the network had allegedly organized between 20 and 30 cocaine shipments since 2005. On 18 November 2011, customs officers at the port of Le Havre seized 231 kilograms of cocaine from a container arriving from Guadeloupe. A controlled delivery subsequently led to the arrest of two men unloading the shipment on 21 November. During a related operation in Baie-Mahault, Guadeloupe, authorities seized a further 272 kilograms of cocaine and €284,930.[3] Soudron was later investigated by the Specialized Interregional Jurisdiction (JIRS) in Paris over the importation of cocaine in shipping containers. He was eventually sent for trial on charges including drug importation and trafficking, money laundering, weapons possession and criminal association.[4] Investigators also suspected Soudron of laundering proceeds from drug trafficking through investments in legitimate businesses in French-speaking Africa.[5]
In February 2016, Soudron was arrested in Bamako, Mali, and handed over to French authorities. He was imprisoned to serve a six-year sentence imposed by the Créteil criminal court in 2004 in a separate drug-trafficking case.[3] In September 2018, while investigators were preparing to place him under formal investigation in connection with the cocaine seized at Le Havre, Soudron was granted temporary prison leave. He failed to return to Réau prison and became a fugitive.[3] Following his escape, Soudron was actively sought by the French National Fugitive Search Brigade (BNRF). Investigators described him as highly mobile and said that he travelled between the French and British Caribbean, French-speaking Africa and Europe, using several identities. French authorities suspected that he may have been hiding in Africa, particularly Senegal or Guinea, where he had invested in legitimate businesses, including construction and real estate. Investigators said that he had significant contacts in the region. In December 2021, French police selected Soudron for Europol's Most Wanted campaign and appealed for information that could help locate him.[6]
On 30 March 2026, Soudron was arrested on Avenida Balboa in Panama City by officers of the Panamanian National Police. According to La Prensa, motorcycle officers stopped Soudron and requested documentation concerning his legal status in the country. During the check, officers discovered that his immigration card contained false information. A subsequent check found that he was wanted by French authorities through Interpol. Soudron was sought by the Créteil Criminal Court in France in connection with offences involving the unauthorized importation and transportation of narcotics and participation in a criminal organization. Following his arrest, Soudron was transferred to Panamanian judicial authorities pending extradition proceedings to France.[7] A Panamanian judge later approved the request, and as of June 2026, Soudron remained in Panama awaiting transfer to France[8]
María Guadalupe López Esquivel[a] (30 March 1998 – 10 January 2020), better known by the alias La Catrina, was a Mexican member of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).
Born in Buenavista, Michoacán, she spent much of her childhood in Tepalcatepec, where she attended Benito Juárez Primary School. She was the daughter of a cattle rancher and a housewife. Neighbors later recalled that she was a good student in her early years, but eventually began spending more time on the streets and at parties rather than at school.[1]
By 2017, López Esquivel had become involved with the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). She left Tepalcatepec and moved to nearby Aguililla, where she lived with a CJNG member. During this period, she became associated with Miguel Fernández, also known by the alias "El M2", a regional commander of CJNG operating in the Tierra Caliente region of Michoacán.[2]
According to Mexican authorities, López Esquivel became one of Fernández's principal lieutenants. Documents recovered during the investigation into the October 2019 El Aguaje ambush indicated that she was responsible for paying the organization's lookouts and was allegedly involved in extortion, kidnappings and armed activities on behalf of the criminal cell.[2] Mexican authorities also identified her as one of the principal members of Fernández's organization.
During this period, López Esquivel developed a public image that distinguished her from many other cartel members. She maintained an active presence on social media, where photographs showed her posing with assault rifles, tactical equipment, motorcycles and luxury vehicles. Several images also depicted her wearing military-style clothing alongside other armed CJNG members.[3]
Authorities linked López Esquivel to the ambush of Michoacán State Police officers near El Aguaje, Aguililla, on 14 October 2019. The attack resulted in the deaths of 13 state police officers and injuries to nine others.[4] During the investigation, security forces recovered documents and intercepted communications that allegedly connected members of Fernández's cell to the attack. In one intercepted recording, a woman identified by authorities as "La Catrina" can be heard responding to instructions issued by Fernández during the operation. Authorities also recovered recordings in which Fernández allegedly ordered cartel members to kill the officers and instructed them to leave a narcomensaje at the scene. A banner left after the attack accused the officers of supporting rival criminal organizations, including the Caballeros Templarios and Los Viagras.[5]
On 10 January 2020, López Esquivel was wounded during a joint operation conducted by the Mexican Army, the National Guard and the Michoacán State Police against a CJNG roadblock near La Bocanada, Tepalcatepec. She was transported to hospital, where she later died from her injuries. During the operation, authorities arrested Miguel Fernández ("El M2") and six other suspected members of the CJNG.[6] López Esquivel was widely identified by the alias "La Catrina", reportedly derived from a tattoo depicting the skeletal figure La Catrina on her thigh. The tattoo later assisted authorities in confirming her identity following her death.[7]
Dámaso López Núñez (born 22 February 1966), also known as El Licenciado, is a Mexican former high-ranking member of the Sinaloa Cartel until his capture in 2017. He is currently serving a life sentence in a maximum-security prison in the United States after pleading guilty to cocaine trafficking in September 2018.
Dámaso López Núñez was born in Eldorado, in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, in February 1966. He studied law but did not graduate. He served as a commander in the Judicial Police of Sinaloa and as an agent of the Public Ministry. He also worked as deputy director of security and custody at the Puente Grande prison in Jalisco.
After the arrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, the Dámaso faction of the Sinaloa Cartel clashed with the Los Chapitos faction, a group made up of Iván Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar, Jesús Alfredo Guzmán Salazar, Ovidio Guzmán López, and Joaquín Guzmán López. The conflict was over control of territories south of Culiacán and the syndicate of El Dorado, a stronghold of the Dámaso López family. Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada also played a significant role in the dispute.
On 2 May 2017, Dámaso López was arrested by elements of the Mexican Army and the Criminal Investigation Agency of the Attorney General’s Office (FGR) in the Anzures neighborhood of Mexico City. The confirmation of the arrest was issued via a Twitter message by the Attorney General’s Office.
Donají was a high-ranking Zapotec woman in precolumbian Mitla. When she was born, a seer predicted that she would die for her country. When she grew up, the Zapotec were involved in one of their many wars with the Mixtec, who generally dominated the area. One day, Zapotec warriors brought a prisoner, a Mixtec prince named Nucano, to Mitla. Taking pity on him, Donají took care of his wounds. When he healed, he asked her to free him, which she did. The war continued, and the Zapotec king and Donaji were forced to abandon their capital of Zaachila. Peace negotiations were attempted, but the Mixtec did not trust the Zapotec king, taking Donají captive as insurance.
Gema Rocío García Figueroa (born 13 February 1990), also known as Gema Garoa, is a Mexican television actress known for her roles in telenovelas produced by Televisa.
Carolina Rangel Gracida (born 18 March 1995) is a Mexican politician serving as the interim secretary of Morena. She previously headed the Secretariat for Substantive Equality and the Development of Women in Michoacán. She is a founding member of the Morena party and a member of the Mexico chapter of Feminist International.
On 24 August 2026, the Viv Ansanm coalition entered the commune of Kenscoff, Haiti and committed a mass killing.
The exact motives of the killings are unclear, but they may be part of a recent push towards establishing territory to the south of Port-au-Prince that gangs has been making.
In December 2025, another massacre left 49 people dead in Port-au-Prince, including 19 gang members.[1]
Verti Enold-Saint, a Kenscoff resident said "if only we had a good police force that would have placed an armored truck here, what happened here would have been prevented."[2]
IDPs from other nearby cities flee to Port-au-Prince and the surrounding metropolitan area to escape violence.
Diego González González is a Colombian lawyer and secretary general of the Colombian Senate. He represents the Union Party for the People (Partido de la U). He has been the Secretary General since 20 July 2026.
↑Most of the fighting took place in rural areas of the country, especially in the north and central highlands. According to records kept by the Contras, the departments with the most deaths were (in descending order): Jinotega, Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Chontales, and Zelaya[3]
↑The Sandinistas won the majority of the combats against the Contras, but the 1990 election disarmed both sides, and ultimately led to a stalemate. This being said, they retook power in 2006 after Daniel Ortega won the election, although this time without hostilities.
The Contra War, also called the Nicaraguan Civil War, was an armed conflict and rebellion that took place from 1981 to 1990 in Nicaragua involving the Contra forces. The conflict started after the Sandinista National Liberation Front, or FSLN, overthrew the ruling government led by Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979. The Sandinistas began to implement socialist policies and repression that angered many people, some of them would go on to form the first group of Contras in 1980.
The war took place within the broader context of the Cold War, drawing significant involvement from the United States, wbhich provided financial, logistical, and covert military support to Contra factions. The conflict resulted in substantial military and civilian casualties, widespread displacement, and economic disruption, and concluded after negotiated peace agreements an and national elections in 1990 that brought an opposition government to power.
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) established a revolutionary government that enacted widespread social and economic reforms. Opposition to Sandinista rule developed from former regime supporters, rural conservatives, and indigenous communities. Beginning in the early 1980s, several anti‑government groups coalesced under the umbrella term “Contras” and began armed resistance against the Sandinista government.[1]
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was authorized by President Ronald Reagan to provide funding, training, and logistical support to Contra groups as part of a broader U.S. policy to counter perceived Soviet influence in Central America.[2]
Course of the conflict
The Contra War was primarily fought through guerrilla tactics by rebel forces, including ambushes, sabotage, and raids on government outposts. Sandinista forces responded with conventional military operations, conscripted troops, and militia units to defend territory, infrastructure, and population centers.[1]
Throughout the 1980s, the conflict drew international attention. In 1986, revelations about covert arms transfers from the United States to Contra forces, circumventing congressional restrictions, became central to the Iran–Contra affair.[3]
Tactics and strategy
Contra forces primarily used hit‑and‑run guerrilla tactics, focusing on disrupting Sandinista supply lines, attacking rural installations, and avoiding large‑scale engagements. The Sandinista government deployed conventional forces and militia units to secure towns, roads, and key infrastructure, often responding to rebel incursions with patrols and fortified defenses.[1]
Impact and casualties
Estimates vary widely, but thousands of combatants on both sides were killed or wounded during the conflict. Civilians were also affected through displacement, loss of livelihood, and damage to infrastructure. The war significantly disrupted Nicaragua’s economy and social structures, particularly in rural areas near the Honduran border.[1]
U.S. president Ronald Reagan took interest in the war from the very start, since his administration took office in 1981. Reagan was afraid that Nicaragua would turn into a "second Cuba", which by then was already under a communist government led by Fidel Castro for 16 years.[4]
The agrarian reforms and nationalization of land by the Sandinista government led many plantation owners and farmers to leave the country. The most common countries for emigration were Costa Rica and the United States. The first wave of about 120,000 Nicaraguans entering the U.S. happened in the 1980s during the Sandinista government. Many of these people were middle-class or wealthy before the revolution. The second wave occured in early 1989, after Hurricane Joan caused upheaval in the country.
By the late 1980s, international pressure and declining morale led to negotiations for a peace settlement. Regional leaders, including Costa Rican president Óscar Arias promoted a peace dea; aimed at ending hostilities in the region. Although fighting continued sporadically, a negotiated settlement and the 1990 election led to the election of Violeta Chamorro and the eventual demobilization of the Contras.[1]
The conflict remains a subject of historical debate regarding American foreign intervention and human rights. Its legacy has effected Nicaragua’s political landscape in the subsequent decades, including its decision to put the FSLN back in power in the 2006 Nicaraguan election.
The Esquipulas Peace Agreement peace agreement was signed by both parties in Esquipulas, Guatemala. The agreement stipulated the demobilization of the Contras, ending the war.
Kyrylo Prystavnyi, known professionally as Avoure, is a Ukrainian DJ and record producer based in Los Angeles, California. He first gained recognition in 2018 with the release of his debut track Aura, which has accumulated over 125 million views on Youtube.[7] He has gained support in the electronic music scene since, collaborating with labels such as This Never Happened, Above & Beyond, Spinnin' Deep, and Anjunabeats.[5] His music has received support from artists including [[Lane 8], Diplo, Hardwell, Tiësto, and ZHU. In 2023, Avoure founded his own independent record label, Biome Recordings, which describes itself as a "fusion of melodic house, techno, breakbeat, and electronica".[5]
Avoure's first collaboration with Lane 8 (Daniel Goldstein) was with the track Voile. Their relationship began when a friend of Avoure from Saint Petersburg mentioned the possibility of sharing his music with Lane 8 via email. After informing him of his email address and an initial exchange between the two, Lane 8 invited him on a collaboration a month later.[8]
It is used in ceremonial, social, and traditional contexts among Indigenous groups in countries including Brazil, Peru, and Colombia.[11] Rapé is administered nasally using a blowpipe, either self-administered or applied by another individual.[12]
The term rapé is a Portuguese and Spanish word derived from the French word "râpé", which means "grated", referring to the grated tobacco traditionally used to make snuff.[13]
Rapé is a fine, dry powder composed primarily of tobacco and plant ash.[9] The tobacco species most commonly used, Nicotiana rustica, contains higher concentrations of nicotine than Nicotiana tabacum.[14]
Preparation typically involves drying and grinding tobacco leaves and combining them with ash derived from selected plants.[12] The specific composition varies between Indigenous groups and regions.[15]
The use of powdered tobacco in the Americas predates European contact.[16] Early European accounts of tobacco snuff use were recorded in the late 15th century following contact with Indigenous peoples of the Caribbean.[17]
Rapé contains nicotine, a stimulant alkaloid that affects the central nervous system.[20]
Chemical analyses of rapé products have identified additional compounds, including tobacco-specific nitrosamines and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.[10]
1234Wilbert, Johannes (1987). Tobacco and Shamanism in South America. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp.6–10.
12Stanfill, Stephen B. (2015). "Comprehensive chemical characterization of rapé tobacco products: Nicotine, un-ionized nicotine, tobacco-specific N'-nitrosamines, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and flavor constituents". Food and Chemical Toxicology. 82: 50–58. doi:10.1016/j.fct.2015.04.012. PMID25921431.
12Russell, Andrew (2015). The Master Plant: Tobacco in Lowland South America. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp.23–30.
12de Smet, Peter A.G.M. (1985). "A multidisciplinary overview of intoxicating snuff rituals in the Western Hemisphere". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 13 (1): 3–49. doi:10.1016/0378-8741(85)90029-3. PMID3883984.
↑Curtis, M.M. (1935). The Book of Snuff and Snuff Boxes. New York: Bramhall House. pp.12–15.
↑Stanfill, Stephen B. (2010). "Surveillance of international oral tobacco products: total nicotine, un-ionized nicotine and tobacco-specific nitrosamines". Tobacco Control. 20 (1): e2. doi:10.1136/tc.2010.036913. PMID20930060.
↑Schultes, Richard Evans (1984). "Fifteen years of study of psychoactive snuffs of South America: 1967–1982—a review". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 11 (1): 17–32. doi:10.1016/0378-8741(84)90035-6. PMID6200055.
↑Elferink, J.G.R. (1983). "The narcotic and hallucinogenic use of tobacco in Pre-Columbian Central America". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 7 (1): 111–122. doi:10.1016/0378-8741(83)90025-9. PMID6343717.
↑McKenna, Terence (1993). Food of the Gods: The Search for the Original Tree of Knowledge. New York: Bantam Books. p.336.
↑Lagrou, Elsje (1996). Shamanism and representation among the Kaxinawá. Florianópolis: Federal University of Santa Catarina. pp.197–231.
↑Jauregui, X. (2011). "Plantas con madre: plants that teach and guide in the shamanic initiation process in the East-Central Peruvian Amazon". Journal of Ethnopharmacology. 134 (3): 739–752. doi:10.1016/j.jep.2011.01.042. PMID21277309.
↑Benowitz, Neal L. (1996). "Pharmacology of nicotine: addiction and therapeutics". Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology. 36: 597–613.
12Smokeless Tobacco and Some Tobacco-specific N-Nitrosamines. Lyon: International Agency for Research on Cancer. 2007. ISBN9789283212898.
↑Wolk, R. (2005). "Hemodynamic and autonomic effects of smokeless tobacco in healthy young men". Journal of the American College of Cardiology. 45 (6): 910–914. doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2004.11.066. PMID15766817.
Cerro MohinoraLocation of the upper and lower Sierra Tarahumara in Chihuahua, which borders the states of Texas and New Mexico.
On 19 April 2026, a diplomatic conflict between Mexico and the United States arose following the deaths of two CIA agents in an accident in the Sierra Tarahumara[es] of Chihuahua. The agents were traveling in a convoy alongside agents from the Chihuahua State Investigation Agency.
They had been returning from dismantling six sophisticated local narcotics laboratories that had been located through drone surveillance flights in an operation involving around one hundred officials, one of the most significant successes in years for Chihuahua’s prosecutor’s office and police.[1]
The Security Cabinet of Mexico expressed its condolences for the deaths of the four agents following the accident, and clarified that the foreign agents had not been authorized to participate in an operation in Mexico.[2]
One week after the incident, the United States Department of Justice announced that the governor of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, along with other members of his administration, would be extradited to the United States over alleged ties to the Sinaloa Cartel.[3]
Four passengers, two Americans and two Mexicans, died on the morning of 19 April 2026 when the vehicle they were traveling in crashed as they were returning from an operation led by Mexico's armed forces to dismantle clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in the mountains of Chihuahua.[4]
President Claudia Sheinbaum stated that she had no knowledge of the presence of U.S. officials on Mexican soil and called on Washington and the State of Chihuahua for explanations regarding a possible violation of national sovereignty.[5]
The Los Angeles Times reported, based on sources familiar with the operation, that two other CIA agents traveling in a vehicle behind theirs climbed down a slope to assist their colleagues, but that by then it was too late. Journalist Steve Fisher's report states that the four U.S. agents who allegedly participated in the operation were dressed in uniforms of the Chihuahua State Investigation Agency (AEI) in order to blend in with Mexican officials. A CIA spokesperson declined to comment to the newspaper.[6]
On April 22, a proposal advanced in the Senate of Mexico from the Morena party calling for a working meeting with the governor of Chihuahua, María Eugenia Campos Galván, and the state prosecutor, César Jáuregui Moreno, so they could explain the alleged participation of two CIA agents in security operations in the state, the failure to properly inform the federal government, the lack of institutional coordination, and the consequences for national sovereignty.[7]
The ruling party pushed for both officials to explain the events in the state, arguing that there may have been a violation of the Constitution of Mexico and the National Security Law due to the participation of alleged foreign agents in actions carried out by the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office.[8][9]
On April 24, 2026, César Jáuregui Moreno resigned from his position as head of the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office following controversy over the entry of U.S. agents, allegedly CIA operatives, who died in the town of Morelos after the dismantling of the drug laboratories.[10][11] "With full respect for transparency, I present my irrevocable resignation as state attorney general. My actions have been guided by the protection of society and the full force of the state in confronting organized crime", the official said at a press conference.
He stated that the fight against crime also requires respect for legality and national sovereignty; however, he acknowledged that in the case of the deaths of the agents, "the information we initially had was inconsistent and warranted an investigation to understand their involvement in detail."
He admitted there were omissions in information handling and institutional management, which undermined the control and communication mechanisms he was responsible for ensuring.[12]
Following the resignation of former prosecutor César Jáuregui Moreno, Governor María Eugenia Campos Galván appointed Wendy Paola Chávez Villanueva as the new head of the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office, stating:[13] "I have appointed Wendy Chávez, current head of the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Women and Family, to lead this Specialized Unit; I am convinced that her career will ensure objectivity and full professionalism in clarifying the facts."
The Senate Constitutional Affairs Committee approved this Wednesday a motion to call a working meeting with the governor of Chihuahua, María Eugenia Campos Galván, and the state prosecutor, César Jáuregui Moreno, so they can report on the alleged presence of officers from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the state, following a highway crash in which four people died. The discussion of the resolution led to a heated confrontation between lawmakers from Morena and the National Action Party (PAN), who exchanged accusations and raised the tone of the debate over the scope of the summons and its political implications.
The resolution, promoted by Morena senator Juan Carlos Loera de la Rosa, was fast-tracked by the Senate’s leadership board and, during Wednesday’s debate, the opposition demanded that the scope of the call to Campos be expanded to include other officials from the ruling party, not just the opposition governor.
PAN senator Marko Cortés Mendoza proposed modifying the agreement to also include appearances by the Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection, Omar García Harfuch; the head of the Secretariat of National Defense, Ricardo Trevilla Trejo; and the Foreign Affairs Minister, Marcelo Ebrard. He also called for a diplomatic note to be sent to the United States requesting information about the presence of agents in Mexican territory, and for the Morena governors of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, and Baja California, Marina del Pilar Ávila Olmeda, to also appear over allegations related to organized crime.
The confrontation escalated when Morena senator Javier Corral Jurado, former governor of Chihuahua, accused the opposition of constructing a narrative based on “lies and fallacies,” and questioned the state government’s performance in public security. Meanwhile, Movimiento Ciudadano (MC) senator Luis Donaldo Colosio Riojas voted against the motion and criticized the legality of the procedure. He argued that the Constitutional Affairs Committee does not have the authority to summon state officials, warning that it violates the principle of federalism. “The Senate cannot summon a governor on this basis. If the issue is reviewing the presence of foreign agents, federal authorities are the ones who should appear,” he said. Colosio also criticized the fact that debate on important constitutional reforms was being displaced in favor of what he described as a politically motivated issue.
The debate included moments of high tension, such as PAN senator Lilly Téllez accusing Morena senator Gerardo Fernández Noroña of illicit enrichment, in an exchange that further heightened the confrontation. Finally, the resolution was approved with 13 votes in favor and one against. The committee chair, Morena senator Óscar Cantón Zetina, announced that the agreement will be forwarded to the Senate leadership board for possible discussion in the full chamber.
The approved document establishes a "respectful invitation" for the governor of Chihuahua and the state prosecutor to report on the events, as well as on possible violations of the National Security Law, failures to notify the federal government, and potential institutional coordination failures.
Slavery in the Dominican Republic has roots that date to the early 16th century.
Colonists and others on the Spanish mainland were forbidden from trading in slaves, but islands such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic were excepted from this rule. Laborious work in sugarcane and to a lesser extent tobacco necessitated this labor, as well as the lack of indigenous people in the Caribbean. Almost all of the slaves were brought from Africa via the triangular trade. Despite the prevalence of the Spanish slave trade in the Caribbean, Haiti is still the country with the most African-descended people in the Caribbean, although Brazil has about twice as many, albeit located in South America.
Oil wells on Lake MaracaiboPetroluem fields, pipelines, and refineries in Venezuela (1972)
The petroleum industry in Venezuela accounts for 15% of its GDP and 37% of its domestic energy consumption.[1][2]
Venezuela's oil exports also account for 80% of its total export revenue.[2]
By 1950, it had a GDP per capita of $5,550,[a] the third highest in Latin America. This was in comparison to other Latin colonies that were significantly more impoverished, like Brazil ($1,850) or Guatemala ($2,040).[3]
Oil was first discovered in the Maracaibo Basin of Zulia in 1914.[4] The first Venezuelan oil well, Zumaque I, was located in Mene Grande, Zulia.[5]
In 1922, the Barroso II oil well exploded in Zulia state, causing a million barrels of crude oil to burst out of the ground. This was when its promise as an oil-rich country was noticed.[6]
In the first decades after oil began to be exploited, foreign companies controlled production, infrastructure, and commercialization. One of the most important was Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, which came to control a substantial share of national production.
In 1960, Venezuela was one of the five founding countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, along with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. Despite this leadership role, foreign companies continued to dominate the industry until nationalization in 1976.
In August 1971, under the presidency of Rafael Caldera, a law was passed that nationalized the country's natural gas industry, foreshadowing the broader oil nationalization to come.
The announcement occurred at the Mene Grande oilfield in Zulia. The transition to the oil industry being run by the state went well. Large American and other foreign companies invested in the country and were also hired by PDVSA for their expertise. Pérez allowed PDVSA to partner with foreign oil companies as long as it held 60% equity in joint ventures, along with other constraints.
During the 1980s, global oil prices plummeted. As global oil prices plummeted in the 1980s, Venezuela's economy contracted and inflation soared; at the same time, it accrued massive foreign debt by purchasing foreign refineries, such as Citgo in the United States.
Hugo Chávez was elected president in 1998 running on a socialist platform. He promised to use the country's oil wealth to reduce poverty in Venezuela, a serious problem at the time.
In 2002, many PDVSA employees went on strike against Chávez, who responsed by firing 19,000 workers from the company. This decision was later criticized, as it removed much of the company's technical expertise.
In 2005, Chávez began to provide subsidized oil to several countries in the region, including Cuba, with Petrocaribe being created later.
In 2007, the government decreed that PDVSA must hold at least a 60% stake in all heavy crude projects in the Orinoco Belt, forcing foreign companies to accept new contractual conditions or leave the country. As a result, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips withdrew from Venezuela.
In mid-2014, global oil prices tumbled and Venezuela's economy went into free fall. Since 2014, oil production in Venezuela has suffered from a poor oil market and Venezuela's insufficient funding of the industry.
In 2016, the oil production reached the lowest it had been in 23 years. The decline continued through subsequent years, with production hitting historic lows during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In January 2026, the Trump administration stated that it would fix Venezuelas oil industry while the U.S. was engaging in Operation Southern Spear. Maduro was captured in Caracas and taken to the U.S. on 3 January 2026.
Venezuela produces over 900,000 barrels of oil per day and has an estimated 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. These reserves account for roughly 17% of the global total, with most concentrated in the Orinoco Belt, where deposits are predominantly heavy crude. There is doubt about the reliability of this figure however, as it is self-reported and not verified by OPEC or another international organization.
At its peak in the 1970s, Venezuela's oil production reached 3.5 million barrels of crude oil per day. By contrast, Venezuela crude oil production was reported at 896,000 barrels per day in December 2025.
Venezuela's oil is abundant but it is known for being more expensive to extract from the ground than oil from the Persian Gulf, which lowers its profitability. The oil being heavy crude means special refineries are needed.
In 1986, PDVSA bought 50% of the United States gasoline brand Citgo from Southland Corporation and in 1990 the remaining half. This gave Venezuela a significant presence in the U.S. market.
PDVSA has not regularly disclosed its financial performance since 2014 and provides extremely limited public information, having not published annual reports or other documentation to improve transparency and corporate governance since 2016.
In 2023, Venezuela's oil exports totaled just $4.05 billion—dwarfed by Saudi Arabia's $181 billion and the U.S.'s $125 billion.
Most of Venezuela's modest oil production goes to China, an ally of the Maduro regime and major investor in the region, with Venezuela currently paying down an estimated $10-billion debt to China, covered in part by oil exports.
The United States bought about 23% of Venezuela's oil in 2023, but data shows that the U.S. didn't buy any in 2020 and 2021.
The United States has been involved in the Venezuelan oil industry.
has been imposing sanctions on Venezuela in some capacity since 2006, although full sanctions against petroleum trade itself did not occur until much later. For almost two decades, Washington has imposed sweeping sanctions against Caracas, the most significant of which have blocked oil imports from PDVSA and prevented the government from accessing the U.S. financial system.
To return Venezuela to its production highs of the early 2000s of around 3 million barrels per day would likely take around $180 billion in extra funding between now and 2040, according to energy intelligence firm Rystad Energy.
Corruption, mismanagement, brain drain, and a lack of repair and upkeep work on critical infrastructure, including throughout Venezuela's flagship Orinoco Heavy Oil Belt, have made operating without significant investment nearly impossible.
12"Venezuela Energy Information". enerdata.com.
Venezuela has the world's largest proven oil reserves at 304 billion barrels, however the country is ranked 18th in petroleum production due to its lower ability to extract it compared to other oil-rich nations.
In 2024, it was producing about 960,000 barrels of crude per day. The state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela corporation (PDVSA) has dominated the sector since it was founded in 1976, with the nationalization of the Venezuelan petroleum industry.
On 27 December 2025, an intercity bus fell into a ravine on the Inter-American Highway in Guatemala, killing 16 and injuring 26 people. The bus was on a route coming from Guatemala City.
Road accidents are common in Guatemala, as the country is mountainous and road infrastructure is less developed than in other places. The Central American volcanic arc specifically the Sierra Madre de Chiapas crosses over much of the central and southern part of the country, and forms the Guatemalan Highlands. As such, it has a high rate of traffic fatalities relative to miles driven. Accidents of this kind tend to be more fatal compared to collisions as well. Totonicapán is located at a very high elevation, at almost 2,500 metres (8,200ft).
The Inter-American Highway is another name for the portion of the Pan-American Highway within Central America. Chicken buses regularly use the highway, as many citizens do not own their own form of motor transportation. The road connects Totonicapán to nearby cities like Quetzaltenango (27km (17mi) away) and Santa Cruz del Quiché. Highways in Guatemala are typically named after a department and a number, for example QUI-4. The Inter-American Highway passes through the center of Totonicapán.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes "that when using the figures, any cross-national comparisons should be conducted with caution because of the differences that exist between the legal definitions of offences in countries, or the different methods of offence counting and recording". Also, not every crime is reported, meaning two things: (1) robbery rates appear lower than they actually are, and (2) the percentage of crime that is not reported is higher in some countries than others; for example, in one country 86% of the robberies were reported, whereas in another country only 67% of the robberies were reported. Crime also varies by certain neighborhoods or areas in each country, so a nationwide rate does not indicate the danger or safety everywhere in that country. A 1983 study by the Department of Justice estimated that the amount of robberies in the US at schools alone may reach one million a year, exceeding the National Crime Survey reported estimate.[4][5]
José María Guízar Valencia, also known by his alias Z-43, is a convicted Mexican criminal. He was the leader of the Zetas Vieja Escuela, a splinter group of Los Zetas active in Tamaulipas.
He was arrested in Mexico City in 2018, being one of the 122 "priority targets" wanted by the Mexican government. The United States had offered a $5 million reward for his capture.[3][4][5]
José Crispín Salazar Zamorano, also known by his alias Don Adán, is the leader of the Los Salazar faction of the Gente Nueva criminal group in Sonora, also known as the Independent Cartel of Sonora.
Irving Eduardo Solano Vera, also known as El Profe or El Gato, is the founder of Gente Nueva, known as the Cártel Independiente de Sonora ('Sonora Independent Cartel') since 2023.
In March 2017, El Mencho ordered the murder of El Cholo, a former CJNG member who betrayed the CJNG by co-founding the Nueva Plaza Cartel and conspiring against his former allies.[6] El Cholo was marked for death by El Mencho after he murdered a CJNG financial operator nicknamed "El Colombiano", but the assassination attempt was a failure. El Cholo afterwards retaliated by co-founding a new cartel called the Nueva Plaza Cartel.[6] CJNG co-founder Erick Valencia Salazar also split with El Mencho and became a high-ranking leader in the Nueva Plaza Cartel.[7] They also have formed a rivalry with El Mencho and the CJNG as well.[8] El Cholo was later murdered, with his body being discovered stabbed and wrapped in plastic on a park bench in downtown Tlaquepaque on 18 March 2021.[9][10]
Consecuencias y reacciones internacionales
El abatimiento de Oseguera Cervantes fue considerado por el gobierno de Estados Unidos como un "gran avance para el mundo" en la lucha contra el narcotráfico.[41] Funcionarios como el subsecretario de Estado Christopher Landau celebraron la operación, recordando que el gobierno estadounidense ofrecía una recompensa de hasta 15 millones de dólares por información que llevara a su captura[37][44]
Tras la muerte de "El Mencho", analistas en seguridad apuntaron a una posible lucha interna por el control de la organización o un intento de reconfiguración del mando del cártel, aunque las autoridades mexicanas se mantuvieron en alerta ante posibles repuntes de violencia derivados del vacío de poder.[40][43]
List of terrorist incidents in 2026
List of massacres in Mexico
Timeline of the Mexican drug war
Spanish equivalents
El 25 de enero de 2026, un grupo de hombres armados irrumpió en un campo de futbol y disparó contra 23 personas, resultando en 11 muertes y 12 heridos. La gobernadora de Guanajuato, Libia Dennise García Muñoz Ledo, anunció la reforzada seguridad en la región y la activación de un operativo conjunto con la Fiscalía General del Estado y fuerzas federales para atender a las víctimas y avanzar con la investigación. El alcalde de Salamanca, César Prieto, confirmó que 11 personas fallecieron en el lugar y 12 resultaron heridas, incluyendo una mujer y un menor de edad.
Хуситы были вовлечены в конфликт с правительством Йемена и с бывшим президентомАли Абдаллой Салехом с начала 2000-х годов. Однако их влияние резко возросло во время переворота 2014—2015 годов, в результате которого они захватили столицу страны Сану и вынудили президента Абд-Раббу Мансура Хади бежать. Захват хуситами власти в сентябре 2014 года привёл к военной интервенции под руководством Саудовской Аравии, которая была направлена на восстановление власти Хади. С этого момента хуситы сохранили контроль над значительными частями северного и западного Йемена.
Хуситы создали параллельное правительство, известное как Верховный Политический Совет, со штаб-квартирой в Сане. ВПС управляет гражданскими службами, налогообложением и правоохранительными органами. Их модель управления основана на сочетании племенных сетей, религиозной идеологии и военного контроля. Ключевые аспекты управления хуситов включают в себя:
Строгие меры безопасности, включая широкомасштабную слежку и задержания политических оппонентов.
Жёстко регулируемые СМИ и доступ в Интернет.
Религиозную политику, которая соответствует верованиям зейдитов, которая часто подвергается критике за подавление инакомыслия.
Экономический контроль, включая налогообложение предприятий и международных организаций по оказанию помощи.
Несмотря на постоянные авиаудары и наступления, хуситы сохранили свой контроль над северным Йеменом, что делает их одним из самых устойчивых субъектов в регионе. Хуситы также сыграли важную роль в кризисе в Красном море, начав воздушные атаки на десятки торговых и военных судов в Красном море, вызвав сотни авиаударов по ракетным объектам и другим целям со стороны сил США и союзников. Кризис связан с войной в Газе, ирано-израильским конфликтом, американо-иранским конфликтом и йеменским кризисом.
Война привела к тяжёлому гуманитарному кризису, в результате которого контролируемые хуситами районы испытывают нехватку продовольствия, экономический спад и ущерб инфраструктуре. Блокада, введённая коалицией во главе с Саудовской Аравией, наряду с внутренними ограничениями на помощь, ухудшила ситуацию. В сообщениях Организации Объединённых Наций и гуманитарных организаций хуситы обвиняются в использовании гуманитарной помощи в качестве инструмента политического давления.
По меньшей мере 56 тыс. мирных жителей и комбатантов были убиты в результате вооружённого насилия в Йемене с января 2016 года. Из-за конфликта начался массовый голод, затронувшему 17 миллионов человек. Нехватка питьевой воды, вызванная истощением водоносных горизонтов и разрушением водной инфраструктуры страны, также стала причиной крупнейшей и наиболее быстро распространяющейся вспышки холеры в современной истории, при этом число предполагаемых случаев превысило Template:Число. С момента начала быстрого распространения вспышки в конце апреля 2017 года погибло более 2226 человек.
Groups in Mesoamerica & belowNicaragua is part of the 'Intermediate Area'
The area comprising modern-day Nicaragua has long been inhabited by various Indigenous groups.
The Pacific coast of Nicaragua was inhabited by groups like the Nicarao before the Spanish arrived. The areas further inland such as in Matagalpa Department were inhabited by other groups like the Cacaopera, and the areas in the east are inhabited by the Miskito people.
There are an estimated 450,000 Indigenous people living in Nicaragua today. The true number however is unknown, as the country does not collect ethnicity data in the census.
The Spanish conquest of Nicaragua killed hundreds of thousands of Indigenous people in Nicaragua through violence and disease. Estimated vary from 300,000 to over 2 million people killed during the 16th century.
This region is sometimes considered to be a part of Mesoamerica (along with El Salvador and parts of Honduras because some parts of Nicaragua spoke a Nahua language, as well as the fact that they shared other cultural traits with Mesoamerican groups.
However, one of the traits they lack is the cultivation of maize. As such, Nicaragua is usually not categorized as being in Mesoamerica, and is instead categorized as belonging to a region known as the Intermediate Area, extending from Nicaragua down to Costa Rica, Panama, the Guajira Peninsula, Zulia, and part of Colombia.
The Cacaopera people are primarily located in the Matagalpa Department. This group spoke a Misumalpan language which is now extinct. The language is unrelated to the other languages spoken in Nicaragua, coming from a different language family.
It has been suggested that the Cacaopera lost their language due to suffering heavy casualties in the first century of Spanish rule. They are still the primary group in Matagalpa today.
From 1954 to 1986, Guatemala was under a series of military leaders.
Eraín Ríos Montt, who was president from 1982 to 1983, is regarded as the most egregious leader. Torture, murder, and other human rights abuses increased significantly during his administration, until he was deposed in a coup.
Most of the presidents during this period were white or ladino, meaning mixed white and mestizo. This term is especially used in Guatemala instead of mestizo.
Operation Red Christmas was an operation undertaken by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to relocate 42 Indigenous Miskito communities away from the Caribbean coast towards inland towns along the Coco River with Honduras, into new communities known as Tasba Pri (Free Land).
This operation was carried out in early 1982, at the outset of Contra actions against the Sandinista government, which were particularly intense in the northeastern region of the Caribbean (or Atlantic) coast.
Navidad Roja fue la operación de traslado de 42 comunidades de indígenas misquitos de la región nor-oriental de la Costa Caribe de Nicaragua desde la franja fronteriza del Río Coco con Honduras hacia el interior del país, a unas nuevas comunidades conocidas como Tasba Pri (Tierra Libre).[1] Esta operación se realizó a principios de 1982, en los inicios de las acciones de los Contras hacia el gobierno sandinista que fueron especialmente virulentas en la región nor-oriental de la costa caribeña o atlántica.
Severo Martóínez Pérez (1973). La Patria del Criollo: Ensayo de interpretación de la realidad colonial guatemalteca.
Modern Guatemalans have varying levels of Indigenous DNA that can be traced to the ancient Maya that inhabited the region.{{{1}}}
The western and central highlands of Guatemala are heavily Indigenous.
The geographical distribution of the modern Maya population is however very different from that of the height of the Maya civilization. The majority of the almost 8 million Maya in Guatemala live in the Guatemalan highlands a mountainous area in the central and southern part of the country, while only 2 million live in the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico and northern Petén, where most of the major sites such as Tikal and Chichén Itzá have been found. Mayanists have hypothesized that this migration was due to the Spanish conquest and potentially the classic Maya collapse that happened more than 600 years earlier.true? Similar to Andean civilizations such as the Inca, the population gradually grew to be greater in the elevated mountains and highlands compared to the vast lowlands of the Petén, Yucatán and the Pacific coast of Guatemala. The terrain led to the development of different mutually unintelligible languages due to reduced contact between groups, such as the Quiché, Mam, and Kaqchikel languages.
During the regime of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, efforts were made to eliminate Maya languages and 'ladinize' the population (make more mestizo). These were successful in some departments, which are almost entirely Ladino and monolingual in Spanish today, despite having significant Indigenous ancestry.
Alta Verapaz is heavily indigenous and primarily populated by the Qʼeqchiʼ Mayan people. The 2018 census recorded 93% of the department's population as belonging to an indigenous group and 80% as belonging to the Qʼeqchiʼ Maya.
HelloTalk has been criticized for its use as a dating app. This has attracted controversy both within the community and in other online forums. Although its gial is to facilitate language learning. the app is ptimarily centered on its chat feature. Some people claim they started romantic relationships through using the app, usually long-distance relationships.
The company has been criticized for encouraging ita use in this way. through prominently featuring lartners of the opposite gender more often, as well as notifications in this vein. Peoplr have critized that HelloTalk no longer primarily focuses on improving language skills.
Reports that users of the app quickly ask language partners for their WhatsApp account raizes further concern over it being abused as a dating app. While HelloTalk aims to connect casual language partners{REF!
}from different countries, WhatsApp focuses on being an instant messaging app primarily used for communication between friends and family. Users who ask their partners to switch to WhatsApp rather than practice second language acquisition have been targeted by criticism as well. HelloTlak has not released any data about the gender of its users as of December 2025{check)
Microsoft Designer is an AI based image creation and design app by Microsoft originally released as a Windows 11 app, as well as on iOS and Android[1]. It is now also available as a web app and can use AI to generate images, edit images, make graphic design projects and icons. It is available on the Microsoft Store for desktop users.
Fansly is an online subscription-based platform that allows content creators to share primarily adult content for a fee. The service was launched in 2020 and is owned by the American company Select Media LLC (based in Baltimore) and the Cypriot company CY Media LTD (Kamares, Cyprus), both associated with Michael Etelis. Fansly is often compared to OnlyFans, as its layout and features are very similar.[1] The platform’s main goal is to allow creators to earn money from content – both Pornography and non-adult – through direct support from subscribers. Users pay a monthly fee for access to creators' content and can also send tips or pay for individual posts and messages.
Select Media LLC was registered in February 2020, while CY Media LTD was registered in May 2021.[2] Fansly started gaining popularity in early 2021. A turning point was August 2021, when OnlyFans announced that it would ban sexually explicit content starting October 2021.[3] Many OnlyFans creators then moved to other platforms, including Fansly. According to Mel Magazine, shortly after the announcement, Fansly received up to 4,000 new registrations per hour, temporarily overloading the platform's servers. Even after OnlyFans reversed its decision and continued allowing adult content, interest in Fansly remained high. By August 2021, the platform had around 2.1 million users.[2]
Fansly operates on a subscription and micropayment model. Creators can set monthly subscription fees for access to their content, sell additional pay-per-view (PPV) content, and accept tips from fans.[4] All revenue comes from three main sources: subscriptions, paid media (photos, videos, audio messages), and tips. The platform also supports live streaming and private messaging between creators and subscribers. Fansly offers advanced monetization tools such as tip goals, automatic responses to tips ("keyword tips"), and content categorization ("wall albums").[4][5]
Fansly includes privacy and security features. Creators can block users from specific locations, making their profile invisible in certain countries, states, or cities.[5] Content can also be restricted to logged-in subscribers only. The platform implements strong age and identity verification systems, working with external services like Ondato.[6] Fansly uses an algorithmic "For You Page" to promote content based on user interests and behavior. The platform's model is similar to other subscription-based services, such as OnlyFans, focusing on flexible monetization for creators.[6][4]
Exact user numbers are not publicly available. By mid-2021, the platform had over 2 million registered users (mainly subscribers and creators).[2] External web traffic analyses indicate that in January 2023, Fansly had around 29 million unique visitors. Most traffic comes from the United States (~39% in 2023), followed by the United Kingdom (5%) and Canada (4.5%).[7] These stats suggest a global reach, though the main user base is in English-speaking countries. By comparison, OnlyFans had over 130 million users (2 million creators) by 2021/2022.[3]
Platforms like OnlyFans and Fansly gained importance during the COVID-19 pandemic as an alternative income source for many adult content creators. Digital media emphasize that subscription services "became a lucrative path" for those affected by the economic crisis.[8]
The social impact of these platforms is debated. On one hand, they allow creators to earn independently without traditional agencies, providing a significant income source. On the other hand, concerns exist regarding negative effects. Analysts note that "the growing influence of these platforms, especially among youth, raises concerns about long-term social effects." Critics warn that easy monetization of adult content can encourage young people to enter a risky "digital sex industry."[8] Reports suggest that sudden platform restrictions, such as the brief OnlyFans ban in 2021, may harm smaller creators, forcing them back to offline work under worse conditions.[9]
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